Treffer: Securing RSA Algorithm Against Side Channel Attacks.

RSA's modular exponentiation is the basic operation in public key infrastructure and is naturally the target of side-channel attacks. In this work we propose two algorithms that defeat side-channel attacks: Paired Permutation Exponentiation (PPE) and Permute, Split, and Accumulate (PSA). We compare these two algorithms with the classic right-to-left technique. All three implementations are evaluated using Intel^® Performance Counter Monitor (PCM) at an effective 0.25 ms sampling interval. We use fixed 2048-bit inputs, pin the Python 3.9.13 process to a single core Intel^® Core™ i5-10210U, and repeat each experiment 100 and 1000 times to characterize behavior and ensemble statistics. Our proposed technique PSA shows the lowest runtime and the strongest hardening against per-bit correlation relative to the standard RtL. Residual leakage related to the Hamming weight of the exponent may remain observable but the only information gathered is the the Hamming weight of the secret key. The exact location of the secret key bits is completely obscured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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