Treffer: Matching markets with farsighted couples

Title:
Matching markets with farsighted couples
Authors:
Atay, Ata, Funck, Sylvain, Mauleon, Ana, Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Source:
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
Publisher Information:
Springer Verlag
Publication Year:
2025
Collection:
Dipòsit Digital de la Universitat de Barcelona
Subject Terms:
Economia de mercat, Teoria de conjunts, Màrqueting, Disseny industrial, Teoria de jocs, Market economy, Set theory, Marketing, Industrial design, Game theory
Document Type:
Fachzeitschrift article in journal/newspaper
File Description:
15 p.; application/pdf
Language:
English
Relation:
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01544-z; Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, vol. 64, p. 465-481; https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01544-z; https://hdl.handle.net/2445/222898; 755699
Availability:
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/222898
Rights:
(c) Springer Verlag, 2025 ; info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Accession Number:
edsbas.79045F41
Database:
BASE

Weitere Informationen

We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted stable set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.