Result: When selfish meets evil : Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game

Title:
When selfish meets evil : Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Authors:
MOSCIBRODA, Thomas, SCHMID, Stefan, WATTENHOFER, Roger
Source:
PODC 2006 (proceedings of the 25th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing). :35-44
Publisher Information:
New York NY: Association for Computing Machinery, 2006.
Publication Year:
2006
Physical Description:
print, 24 ref 1
Original Material:
INIST-CNRS
Subject Terms:
Computer science, Informatique, Sciences exactes et technologie, Exact sciences and technology, Sciences appliquees, Applied sciences, Informatique; automatique theorique; systemes, Computer science; control theory; systems, Logiciel, Software, Systèmes informatiques et systèmes répartis. Interface utilisateur, Computer systems and distributed systems. User interface, Approche probabiliste, Probabilistic approach, Enfoque probabilista, Calcul réparti, Distributed computing, Cálculo repartido, Modélisation, Modeling, Modelización, Optimisation, Optimization, Optimización, Optimum, Optimo, Psychologie sociale, Social psychology, Psicología social, Système réparti, Distributed system, Sistema repartido, Théorie jeu, Game theory, Teoría juego, Economie providence, Wellfare economy, Economía providencia
Document Type:
Conference Conference Paper
File Description:
text
Language:
English
Author Affiliations:
Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
Access URL:
http://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=search&terms=18597358
Rights:
Copyright 2007 INIST-CNRS
CC BY 4.0
Sauf mention contraire ci-dessus, le contenu de cette notice bibliographique peut être utilisé dans le cadre d’une licence CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS / Unless otherwise stated above, the content of this bibliographic record may be used under a CC BY 4.0 licence by Inist-CNRS / A menos que se haya señalado antes, el contenido de este registro bibliográfico puede ser utilizado al amparo de una licencia CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS
Notes:
Computer science; theoretical automation; systems
Accession Number:
edscal.18597358
Database:
PASCAL Archive

Further Information

Over the last years, game theory has provided great insights into the behavior of distributed systems by modeling the players as utility-maximizing agents. In particular, it has been shown that selfishness causes many systems to perform in a globally suboptimal fashion. Such systems are said to have a large Price of Anarchy. In this paper, we extend this active field of research by allowing some players to be malicious or Byzantine rather than selfish. We ask: What is the impact of Byzantine players on the system's efficiency compared to purely selfish environments or compared to the social optimum? In particular, we introduce the Price of Malice which captures this efficiency degradation. As an example, we analyze the Price of Malice of a game which models the containment of the spread of viruses. In this game, each node can choose whether or not to install anti-virus software. Then, a virus starts from a random node and iteratively infects all neighboring nodes which are not inoculated. We establish various results about this game. For instance, we quantify how much the presence of Byzantine players can deteriorate or-in case of highly risk-averse selfish players-improve the social welfare of the distributed system.