Treffer: Two Dimension Spectrum Allocation for Cognitive Radio Networks

Title:
Two Dimension Spectrum Allocation for Cognitive Radio Networks
Authors:
CHANGLE LI, ZHE LIU, XIAOYAN GENG, MO DONG, FENG YANG, XIAOYING GAN, XIAOHUA TIAN, XINBING WANG
Source:
IEEE transactions on wireless communications. 13(3):1410-1423
Publisher Information:
New York, NY: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2014.
Publication Year:
2014
Physical Description:
print, 29 ref
Original Material:
INIST-CNRS
Subject Terms:
Telecommunications, Télécommunications, Sciences exactes et technologie, Exact sciences and technology, Sciences appliquees, Applied sciences, Telecommunications et theorie de l'information, Telecommunications and information theory, Télécommunications, Telecommunications, Radiocommunications, Organisation, exploitation et plans de développement, Organization, operation and development plans, Techniques spécifiques de radiocommunications, Radiocommunication specific techniques, Algorithme glouton, Greedy algorithm, Algoritmo glotón, Allocation fréquence, Frequency allocation, Asignación frecuencia, Borne supérieure, Upper bound, Cota superior, Complexité calcul, Computational complexity, Complejidad computación, Conversion fréquence, Frequency conversion, Conversión frecuencia, Diviseur fréquence, Frequency divider, Divisor frecuencia, Enchère, Bidding, Subasta, Evaluation performance, Performance evaluation, Evaluación prestación, Flexibilité, Flexibility, Flexibilidad, Modèle 2 dimensions, Two dimensional model, Modelo 2 dimensiones, Méthode cas pire, Worst case method, Método caso peor, Méthode combinatoire, Combinatorial method, Método combinatorio, Radio logicielle, Software radio, Radio logicial, Radiocommunication, Radio communication, Radiocomunicación, Simulation, Simulación, Temps polynomial, Polynomial time, Tiempo polinomial, Cognitive radio networks, combinatorial auction, spectrum allocation
Document Type:
Fachzeitschrift Article
File Description:
text
Language:
English
Author Affiliations:
State Key laboratory of Integrated Service Networks, Xidian University, Xi'an, Shaanxi, 710071, China
Department of Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200240, China
State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, 100876, China
National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory, Southeast University, Nanjing, 211102, China
ISSN:
1536-1276
Access URL:
http://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=search&terms=28403416
Rights:
Copyright 2015 INIST-CNRS
CC BY 4.0
Sauf mention contraire ci-dessus, le contenu de cette notice bibliographique peut être utilisé dans le cadre d’une licence CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS / Unless otherwise stated above, the content of this bibliographic record may be used under a CC BY 4.0 licence by Inist-CNRS / A menos que se haya señalado antes, el contenido de este registro bibliográfico puede ser utilizado al amparo de una licencia CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS
Notes:
Telecommunications and information theory
Accession Number:
edscal.28403416
Database:
PASCAL Archive

Weitere Informationen

In this paper1 , we develop a truthful and efficient combinatorial auction scheme under a novel spectrum allocation model that can achieve a worst-case approximation ratio √m in social welfare. We propose to tackle the dynamic spectrum access problem in cognitive radio (CR) networks with time-frequency flexibility requirements. We model the spectrum opportunity in a time-frequency division manner and the spectrum allocation as a combinatorial auction. Then we design an auction mechanism to reach the upper bound in polynomial time and propose a combined approach to improve the bound in the cost of increasing computational complexity. A truthful payment that gives incentive to the SUs for revealing the truthful valuation of the desirable bundle of slots is presented. In order to reduce the complexity, we simplify the general model to a modified model that only allows frequency flexibility, and then present a truthful, optimal and computationally efficient auction mechanism. Extensive simulation results of the social welfare and spectrum ratio show that the performance of the combined approximation algorithm is better than the sorting based greedy algorithm.