Treffer: Analysing approximate confinement under uniform attacks
Title:
Analysing approximate confinement under uniform attacks
Authors:
Source:
SAS 2002 : static analysis (Madrid, 17-20 September 2002)Lecture notes in computer science. :310-325
Publisher Information:
Berlin: Springer, 2002.
Publication Year:
2002
Physical Description:
print, 22 ref
Original Material:
INIST-CNRS
Subject Terms:
Computer science, Informatique, Sciences exactes et technologie, Exact sciences and technology, Sciences appliquees, Applied sciences, Informatique; automatique theorique; systemes, Computer science; control theory; systems, Informatique théorique, Theoretical computing, Théorie programmation, Programming theory, Algèbre processus, Process algebra, Algebra proceso, Approche probabiliste, Probabilistic approach, Enfoque probabilista, Interprétation probabiliste, Probabilistic interpretation, Interpretación probabilísta, Programme concurrent, Concurrent program, Programa competidor, Représentation connaissances, Knowledge representation, Representación conocimientos, Programmation concurrente par contrainte, Concurrent constraint programming
Document Type:
Konferenz
Conference Paper
File Description:
text
Language:
English
Author Affiliations:
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universitá di Pisa, Italy
Department of Computing, Imperial College, London, United Kingdom
Department of Computing, Imperial College, London, United Kingdom
ISSN:
0302-9743
Rights:
Copyright 2003 INIST-CNRS
CC BY 4.0
Sauf mention contraire ci-dessus, le contenu de cette notice bibliographique peut être utilisé dans le cadre d’une licence CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS / Unless otherwise stated above, the content of this bibliographic record may be used under a CC BY 4.0 licence by Inist-CNRS / A menos que se haya señalado antes, el contenido de este registro bibliográfico puede ser utilizado al amparo de una licencia CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS
CC BY 4.0
Sauf mention contraire ci-dessus, le contenu de cette notice bibliographique peut être utilisé dans le cadre d’une licence CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS / Unless otherwise stated above, the content of this bibliographic record may be used under a CC BY 4.0 licence by Inist-CNRS / A menos que se haya señalado antes, el contenido de este registro bibliográfico puede ser utilizado al amparo de una licencia CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS
Notes:
Computer science; theoretical automation; systems
Accession Number:
edscal.14985511
Database:
PASCAL Archive
Weitere Informationen
We are concerned to give certain guarantees about the security of a system. We identify two kinds of attack: the internally scheduled attack (exemplified by Trojan Horse attacks) and externally scheduled attacks (exemplified by timing attacks). In this paper we focus on the latter. We present a semantic framework for studying such attacks in the context of PCCP, a simple process algebra with a constraint store. We show that a measure of the efficacy of an attacker can be determined by considering its observable behaviour over the average store of the system (for some number of steps). We show how to construct an analysis to determine the average store using the technique of probabilistic interpretation.