Result: Algorithms and the calculation of Nash equilibria for multi-objective control of time-discrete systems and polynomial-time algorithms for dynamic c-games on networks : Challenges of Continous Optimization in Theory and Applications
Title:
Algorithms and the calculation of Nash equilibria for multi-objective control of time-discrete systems and polynomial-time algorithms for dynamic c-games on networks : Challenges of Continous Optimization in Theory and Applications
Authors:
Source:
European journal of operational research. 181(3):1214-1232
Publisher Information:
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
Publication Year:
2007
Physical Description:
print, 26 ref
Original Material:
INIST-CNRS
Subject Terms:
Control theory, operational research, Automatique, recherche opérationnelle, Sciences exactes et technologie, Exact sciences and technology, Sciences appliquees, Applied sciences, Recherche operationnelle. Gestion, Operational research. Management science, Recherche opérationnelle et modèles formalisés de gestion, Operational research and scientific management, Théorie de la décision. Théorie de l'utilité, Decision theory. Utility theory, Analyse décision, Decision analysis, Análisis decisión, Condition non stationnaire, Non stationary condition, Condición no estacionaria, Condition stationnaire, Stationary condition, Condición estacionaria, Jeu dynamique, Dynamic game, Juego dinámico, Optimum Pareto, Pareto optimum, Optimo Pareto, Processus non stationnaire, Non stationary process, Proceso no estacionario, Programmation multiobjectif, Multiobjective programming, Programación multiobjetivo, Stratégie Nash, Nash strategy, Estrategia Nash, Système complexe, Complex system, Sistema complejo, Système dynamique, Dynamical system, Sistema dinámico, Système temps discret, Discrete time systems, Temps polynomial, Polynomial time, Tiempo polinomial, Théorie jeu, Game theory, Teoría juego, Théorème existence, Existence theorem, Teorema existencia, Multi-objective control, Multiobjective games, Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, Pareto-Nash equilibria, Time-discrete system, c-game on networks
Document Type:
Conference
Conference Paper
File Description:
text
Language:
English
Author Affiliations:
Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Academy of Sciences, Academy street 5, Kishinev, 2028, Moldova, Republic of
Department of Computer Science, University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich, 85577 Munich, Germany
Department of Computer Science, University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich, 85577 Munich, Germany
ISSN:
0377-2217
Rights:
Copyright 2007 INIST-CNRS
CC BY 4.0
Sauf mention contraire ci-dessus, le contenu de cette notice bibliographique peut être utilisé dans le cadre d’une licence CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS / Unless otherwise stated above, the content of this bibliographic record may be used under a CC BY 4.0 licence by Inist-CNRS / A menos que se haya señalado antes, el contenido de este registro bibliográfico puede ser utilizado al amparo de una licencia CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS
CC BY 4.0
Sauf mention contraire ci-dessus, le contenu de cette notice bibliographique peut être utilisé dans le cadre d’une licence CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS / Unless otherwise stated above, the content of this bibliographic record may be used under a CC BY 4.0 licence by Inist-CNRS / A menos que se haya señalado antes, el contenido de este registro bibliográfico puede ser utilizado al amparo de una licencia CC BY 4.0 Inist-CNRS
Notes:
Operational research. Management
Accession Number:
edscal.18674436
Database:
PASCAL Archive
Further Information
We consider a multi-objective control problem of time-discrete systems with given starting and final states. The dynamics of the system are controlled by p actors (players). Each of the players intends to minimize his own integral-time cost of the system's transitions using a certain admissible trajectory. Nash Equilibria conditions are derived and algorithms for solving dynamic games in positional form are proposed in this paper. The existence theorem for Nash equilibria is related to the introduction of an auxiliary dynamic c-game. Stationary and non-stationary cases are described. The paper concludes with a complexity analysis for that decision process.